that appears destined to define success or failure in today's conflicts are our military's role or lack thereof in supporting local host nation governance. Instead of relying primarily on firepower and security tasks to achieve the desired end state, the U.S. military and our partners must consider measures that bolster effective local government as the decisive effort in COIN. Critical in this discussion is adapting our training, partnership strategies, and organizational structure in propelling local governance to the forefront in counterinsurgency warfare.
THE 21 ST CENTURY LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: FIGHTING INSURGENCY THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE
There is little dispute that the 21 st The "unanticipated collapse of Iraq's infrastructure" following the March 2003 invasion left the U.S. led coalition with a daunting task of providing immediate national, sub-national, regional, and local governance support to the Iraqi people.
Century begins with a U.S. military focused on counterinsurgency strategies designed around defeating global extremism.
Conventional military threats no longer dominate the international diplomatic front or our military operational planning and doctrine focus. Instead, our U.S. civilian and military leadership face threats that demand a shift in how we see the enemy, ourselves, and organizationally train and equip for combat. Indeed, the very word combat in essence is a part of this transformation and redefinition. Non lethal objectives and tasks today are arguably more relevant, than the use of military fires and kinetic force applications.
Civilian populations not enemy formations become the center of gravity for metrics in winning or losing in this Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The question then remains, how do you 'win' the population as a means to defeat the insurgency? This paper argues that the answer lies in our military's ability to affectively partner and support host nation local governance. 1 The immediate results were dismal and likely contributed to the widespread breakdown in rule of law, loss of essential services, and the nexus for the Iraqi insurgency. The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), stood up in February 2003 to assist the post invasion objectives, was "not designed or capable to cope with this void in governmental leadership" and competencies. 2 The Coalition Provisional Authority today unlike previous years, will likely "impact our nations foreign policy goals" through their personal engagements with local host nation officials. 5 Our charter as an military organization remains the ability to culturally institutionalize this COIN task as a necessary means to an end in conflict resolution. This paper will discuss and articulate recommendations in our current COIN training strategies, in theater partnership alignments, intelligence systems, and organizational adaptability in supporting local host nation governmental institutions. As a framework for discussion and logical proposals, In the long run, developing better governance will probably affect the lives of the populace more than any other COIN activities. When well executed, these actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. 6 The above statement extracted straight from our counterinsurgency field manual reflects our Army's vision on the importance of governance in COIN operations.
Assisting local governance as a means to an end in counterinsurgency warfare is sound guidance found throughout much of our recent updated doctrinal materials. FM 7-15, Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host nation government…..Legitimacy also means the local populace's perception of their own internal government. Civil military operations that support local governments allows for the populace to perceive that the government has genuine authority to govern and use proper agencies for support.
Even our joint publications provide additional clarity on the role governance plays in counterinsurgency operations. JP3-0 states: 8 The difficult challenge is our Army and perhaps DOD in general fail to adequately train conventional forces on civic responsibilities relating to host nation governance.
The preponderance of tasks associated with preparing for today's COIN operations focus primarily on force protection and kinetic skill sets. Indeed, the latest FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM) Army OIF/OEF tasks dated 17Nov09 mandates over 70 major tasks encompassing individual through collective training requirements for deploying units. 9 All COIN and conventional tasks prescribed within the message cover a wide range of lethal and non lethal training prerequisites; yet, fall short in addressing host nation governance tasks. Ironically once units deploy, most discover their attention focused on assisting, supporting, and in some cases leading local governments or host nation security forces. A recent RAND article that looked at COIN in the Muslim world estimated that nearly 40,000 US Soldiers and Marines were currently performing "civic functions" in support of reconstruction and good governance. 10 This number, while certainly not indicative of the entire force, does represent a sizable military population that is dedicated to supporting or advising host nation governance. Retired Army officer LTC John Nagl, who has written extensively on counterinsurgency warfare, also stated that when looking at the Afghanistan surge "a renewed U.S. commitment to funding grass roots development and governance must accompany the influx of troops." 11 The apparent observation then becomes changing our military training culture from a bullet centric mentality to that involving mayoral responsibilities. This is not to say that we should forgo kinetic or lethal training and validation. Quite the contrary, the complexity of our weapon systems and the risks associated with fighting a radicalized enemy demand a pre-deployment effort centered on fighting. This kinetic training methodology, however, is only half the battle -the defensive side. Winning a counterinsurgency campaign requires thinking offensively in our training by looking as our field manual directs, at the "root cause of insurgencies." 12 Failing to see the enemy through this lens may "often slow or prevent the timely resolution of the conflict" as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan today. Other less formalized and ad hoc solutions are already making their way from the field back to units preparing for deployment. The key phrase though is "from the field"
and not originating from our training base. Most deployed forces for example, recognizing the strategic support to governance importance develop local "anthropologist's guides" for the inbound replacing unit's train up and educational benefits. 16 These phamplets, booklets, and/or in some cases wiring diagrams assist all levels of leadership in gaining a better civic perspective in counterinsurgency warfare. example provides sewage, water, and trash services through the Beladiya (local municipalities); however, the Minister of Water also provides this same service in certain parts of Iraq and Baghdad for that matter.
• Electricity considered a municipality issue by western standards, is actually controlled by the Minister of Electricity.
• Governors of provinces and the governor of Baghdad have their own separate line of authority and responsibilities that often conflict with local districts and the Council of Representatives (COR).
• CPA Order 71 established the formal framework for sub-national Iraqi
governance. The Minister of Finance (MOF) and Ministry of Planning and
Cooperative Development (MOPCD) however resist supporting this order due to its western origin. As a result, local district councils struggle for financing and reconstruction aid. 18 The challenge though is that governance information while in some cases available is just that, information. What is missing is a top driven training validation process that incorporates operational governance feedback lessons throughout our training systems.
Possibly the right step in redesigning our training methodology begins with defining governance from a service delivery standpoint. who, what, and the why on when reconstruction aid mysteriously arrived in their sector.
They certainly had the "pulse of the people" on the ground but were challenged in connecting requirements at street level with resources available at the national level. 35 Today, through the help of the U.S. military, significant financial aid is reaching a broad range of Iraqi and Afghan government and civic agencies; yet, not without years of discovery learning -largely at the expense of the Iraqi/Afghanistan population and the U.S. taxpayer. Suffice to say, commanding or leading in counterinsurgency warfare requires skills that advance well beyond just fighting. Regardless of the 'how' we conduct governance training, our current strategy must align or mirror with the majority of the operational tasks being performed in a COIN environment. Wall Street journalist
Michael Phillips noted this point on a recent embed with an army cavalry squadron in
Afghanistan by stating that most leaders were as much "sociologist as Soldiers." 36 He further observed that most commanders required "the sensitivity of a social worker, the cultural awareness of an anthropologist and the deal-making abilities a big-city mayor." 37 
Engagement through Partnership
Balancing our future COIN training strategies with increased emphasis on governance and civic awareness is perhaps the best tool in conflict resolution. Understanding the campaign end state from this context may very well promote a train as you fight shift in tasks focusing more on civil support than a lethal fire and maneuver methodology.
You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and….logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history….You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have been finally solved by military power. 38 Since the end of the Cold War, the United States DOS civilian diplomatic corps has shrunk, not grown. Budget cuts, reduced staffing, and increased responsibilities worldwide have undermined DOS's diplomacy and assistance abroad. 39 The military has filled large gaps in our 21 st Century global engagement strategy not to mention our civic responsibilities within Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, more than any time in our history, military leaders of all ranks find themselves in the unavoidable position in shaping foreign policy. A vivid illustration of this issue can be seen in Afghanistan where in early 2009 there were only 300 DOS personnel assigned to the theater compared to nearly 70,000 DOD personnel. 40 Given these realities in U.S. foreign service shortages, the military increasingly is seen playing a major role in host nation government partnership. This civilian diplomatic deficiency requires military commanders to become, by default, the political advisors to the local, regional, or national host nation governing officials. As one young Marine lieutenant so aptly stated in Iraq when supporting local leaders in water distribution that, "this is something the State Department is suppose to handle but I was the Marine platoon commander on the ground, and I had to decide how and where the water would get distributed." 46 DOS and other civilian inter-agencies often have the big "war winning" picture responsibility for COIN but lack capacity, manpower, and resources to affect change. LTG Barno, described this issue in a recent essay in which we fail as a military to see the "big picture" and don't understand the "vital importance of integrating the civil-military effort." 47 The reality he goes on to state is that "the civil resources be it manpower" or equipment will demand that military leaders and their organizations play a significant role in the "80% non-military dimension" of counterinsurgency warfare. 48 Unfortunately as LTG Barno articulates we [the military]
tend to "go it alone" and not fully "harmonize" our efforts with civilian agencies focused on the same end state. 49 "Communicating and building relationships" with U.S. civilian and host nation political constituents was just as important, he concludes if not more so than any tactical victory against the Taliban. If the "embassy" failed in their mission as LTG Barno reminded his staff, then "we all fail in Afghanistan". 50 Intelligence Support to Governance
This senior leader COIN analysis provides invaluable partnership insights not only specific to Afghanistan but arguably relevant for any counterinsurgency setting.
Developing host nation civic relationships also demands that we rethink our intelligence strategies. Seeing the enemy from a non-lethal lens is justifiably just as important in a counterinsurgency conflict, than our traditional conventional intelligence gathering view point. Our counterinsurgency doctrine reminds us that intelligence preparation in a COIN environment must analyze "civilian power and authority, society, culture, language, and social structures." 51 David Galula further reiterates this message by recommending a thorough analysis on the legitimacy of local leaders. 52 Unit commanders he suggests must "test" local leaders to determine their honesty and integrity in regards to good governance. If deemed unworthy, these leaders must be removed. 53 The paradigm shift for most leaders today is applying our intelligence gathering capacity in this venue. Unfortunately, our military remains focused on the lethal targeting side as opposed to the full counterinsurgency spectrum. MG Michael Flynn,
Deputy CoS for Intelligence for the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan, recommends sweeping changes to our collection efforts based on this very same observation. His recent well spoken article surmises that:
The United States has focused the overwhelming majority of intelligence gathering and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, yet our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade. Simply put, we must apply intelligence with less emphasis on our analytical technical systems and more towards the human element in counterinsurgency conflicts. 56 Long standing internal grievances for instance if not understood upfront, could drive one faction or "aggrieved party" to embrace the Taliban or Al Qaeda more than any ideological beliefs. 57 Applying our intelligence systems and structures across a much broader sphere requires more than just a focus at the battalion level. Brigade and higher intelligence capabilities also must remain relevant through a greater emphasis on seeing the enemy through this lens. Regional, sub-national, and national governing systems by default are typically complicated and require paradigm changes on how we view collection in this area. Incorporating civil affairs teams, PRTs, and even putting analysts in the field as MG Flynn suggests gets at the collection requirements in seeing the enemy from this perspective. Nearly a decade later however, our military hierarchy still remains fixated on kinetic solutions as opposed to using intelligence to identify societal issues that fuel the insurgency. Perhaps the solution lies in our ability to adapt as an organization in order to maximize finite manning and equipping platforms in support of non-traditional civic or society targets.
Organizational Adaptability to Support Host Nation Governance
Essential elements of successful operations in Iraq included a keen understanding of the situation, integration of all arms and joint capabilities, the development and integration of indigenous forces, and military support to governance. 58 The must consider this principle particularly as it applies towards supporting local host nation civic authorities.
Conclusion
Victory in counterinsurgency warfare does not require that our military create "the development of a "modern European" or Middle Eastern state. 66 Success can be judged in a security environment that provides national stability, sovereignty, and good governance that meets "the basic needs of the people in terms of justice, economic opportunity, and political enfranchisement." 67 The latter as this paper proposes is arguably the most difficult and most complex for our U.S. military: difficult, though not impossible. Revamping our training strategy is obviously the first step in preparing leaders and units alike for this complex COIN condition. Understanding also partnership relationships with both U.S. civilian agencies and foreign governments from an execution standpoint is perhaps just as important in implementing any governance supporting strategies. Additionally, viewing civic and societal issues from an intelligence lens is vital in determining root cause insurgency issues that often are more non lethal than they are lethal. Finally and likely most importantly, we must institutionalize organizational adaptability focusing on governance as the primary defeat mechanism in counterinsurgency campaign. Fundamentally, our military must recognize that the means to the end in fighting the insurgency is not about the biggest weapon but rather how effective host nation governance is in supporting their own people. As the late T.E. Lawrence stated nearly 100 years ago "Irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge" remains an axiom of truth for all military leaders today. 68 Adaptability, social, and cultural awareness marked his success both on and off the battlefield a century ago. The quandary remains for 21 st Century counterinsurgency warfare leaders is our ability to also adapt and attack the enemy much differently than in previous decades. Becoming the 21 st Century Lawrence of Arabia is perhaps the goal in finding victory through good governance as opposed to winning battlefield engagements that may provide no long term solution.
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